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The Open Budget Survey 2008 finds that, overall, the 
state of budget transparency around the world is deplor-
able.  In most of the countries surveyed the public does 
not have access to the comprehensive and timely infor-
mation needed to participate meaningfully in the budget 
process and to hold government to account.  This lack of 
transparency encourages inappropriate, wasteful, and 
corrupt spending and—because it shuts the public out of 
decision making—reduces the legitimacy and impact of 
anti-poverty initiatives.  
Although the overall performance paints a bleak picture, 
there are a number of countries in the Survey that have 
significantly improved their budget transparency perfor-
mance over the past two years.  The Survey also finds that 
many more governments could quickly improve budget 
transparency at low cost by making publicly available the 
budget information that they already produce for donors 
or internal use.   
The Open Budget Survey provides government officials, 
legislators, development practitioners, civil society organi-
zations, journalists, and researchers with an independent, 
comparative measure of government budget transparency 
in 85 countries around the world.  The Survey report also 
suggests reforms that countries might adopt to improve 
budget transparency, increase public participation, and 
strengthen institutions of accountability.  
The International Budget Partnership (IBP) undertook 
this initiative because of the far-reaching implications of 
improving budget transparency.  The provision of timely, 
useful, and accessible information is a first step toward 
greater accountability.  It allows civil society, journalists, 
legislatures, and supreme audit institutions (SAIs) to take 
action to promote effective budget oversight.  And greater 
public participation throughout the budget process can 
improve the credibility of policy choices and the effective-
ness of government interventions.  
Open Budget Index 2008 shows 
worldwide transparency gaps
To easily measure the overall commitment of the 85 coun-
tries to transparency and to allow for comparisons among 
countries, IBP created the Open Budget Index 2008 (OBI) 
from the Survey.
Only five countries of the 85 surveyed—France, New 
Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—make extensive information publicly avail-
able as required by generally accepted good public financial 
management practices.  A further 12 countries provide 
substantial information to the public.  
The remaining 68 countries score poorly on the OBI.  The 
25 countries that provide scant or no budget informa-
tion include low-income countries like Cambodia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nicaragua, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, as well as several middle- and high-income coun-
tries, such as China, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia.  (See OBI 
Rankings on pg.  9.)
In 23 of the 25 poorest performing countries, the public 
cannot even see the Executive’s Budget Proposal before it 
is approved by the legislature.  Instead, the public receives 
the annual budget as a fait accompli.  Thus those most 
directly affected by the ultimate decisions cannot have 
any meaningful input into the formulation or discussion 
of the government’s budget policies.  
Many of the more opaque countries have similar charac-
teristics.  They are located mostly in sub-Saharan Africa or 
the Middle East and North Africa, they are generally poor, 
are often heavily dependent on foreign aid or oil and gas 
revenues, and are frequently ruled by autocratic regimes. 
Lack of transparency undermines 
accountability
Almost all countries publish the annual budget after it is 
approved by the legislature.  The exceptions are China, 
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Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.  Most coun-
tries provide much less information during the drafting, 
execution, and auditing stages of the budget process.  This 
prevents the public from having input on overarching poli-
cies and priorities, improving value for money, and curb-
ing corruption. 
Weak formal oversight institutions 
exacerbate the situation
The obstacles to public oversight of budgeting are often 
compounded by weak formal oversight institutions.  In 
the majority of countries surveyed, legislatures have 
very limited powers, time, and capacity to review the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal and monitor its implementa-
tion.  Likewise, in many countries the supreme audit insti-
tutions do not have sufficient independence or funding to 
fulfill their mandate, and often there are no mechanisms 
in place to track whether the executive follows up on the 
SAI’s recommendations.  
But immediate improvements 
are possible
Despite the generally poor performance of the coun-
tries surveyed, the OBI 2008 offers grounds for hope. 
Comparisons between the OBI results for 2006 and those 
for 2008 show that some countries have started to improve 
their budget transparency over the past two years.  In 
Croatia, Kenya, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, in particular, signifi-
cant improvements either were influenced by the activities 
of civil society groups or have created opportunities for 
greater civil society interventions.  Important improve-
ments in budget transparency were also documented in 
Bulgaria, Egypt, Georgia, and Papua New Guinea.  
In addition to these improvements, another hopeful find-
ing is that good performance on measures of transparency 
and accountability can occur in challenging contexts. For 
instance, within Africa, Botswana and South Africa have 
achieved impressive levels of transparency, while Jordan’s 
results are above average for the Middle East and North 
Africa.  Lower income countries Peru and Sri Lanka both 
provide their citizens with a significant amount of budget 
information, and Ghana and Uganda score above average 
among aid-dependent countries.  
Finally, the Survey finds that progress could be made else-
where quickly and at relatively low cost, if there were suf-
ficient political will.  Many countries with poor OBI 2008 
scores are already producing much of the budget informa-
tion required for good practice.  By making the information 
they already produce for their donors or internal purposes 
available to the public, these countries would increase their 
OBI score.  More important, doing so would encourage 
effective oversight and improve accountability.  
IBP calls for urgent attention 
to budget transparency and 
accountability
IBP calls on individuals, civil society organizations, gov-
ernments, legislatures, SAIs, and donors to take action 
to raise the profile of these problems and demand urgent 
improvements in public access to budget information.
To achieve immediate improvements in budget transpar-
ency, IBP urges: 
Governments »  to make publicly available the budget 
information that they already produce.  In all those 
countries where information is produced but withheld 
from the public, governments should immediately 
release it. 
International financial institutions and donors »  to 
encourage aid-recipient governments to make publicly 
available the budget information they produce for their 
donors or internal purposes.
Civil society »  to publicize and demand explanations for 
instances in which governments do not make publicly 
available the budget information they produce for their 





Beyond these immediate steps, the IBP recommends that 
governments, donors, and civil society take the follow-
ing actions to improve budget transparency in the near 
term.   
Governments
Disseminate budget information in forms and through  »
methods and media that are understandable and 
useful to the wider population.  This should include 
disseminating information through radio or other 
broadcast media, and in languages spoken by the major-
ity of the population.
Institutionalize mechanisms for public involvement  »
in the budget process, including public hearings 
during formulation and discussion of the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal, and at regular intervals throughout 
the budget cycle. 
Expand opportunities for media coverage of the bud- »
get process, for example, by opening budget hearings 
to journalists or broadcasting these hearings on radio, 
television, and the Internet.
Support relevant reforms to improve the independence  »
and capacity of the legislature and supreme audit 
institution to play their formal oversight role.  Reforms 
should address the political and financial independence 
of these institutions, as well as their analytical capacity, 
access to the executive, and other legal powers required 
to fulfill their mandate. 
Build effective public finance information systems  » that 
enhance the quality and timeliness of available budget 
information, for example, through the use of clear, 
standardized classification systems and appropriate 
Information Technology (IT).
International financial institutions 
and donors
Increase the transparency of aid flows and avoid  »
off-budget funding.   Wherever possible, channel aid 
flows through local budget systems.   Where this is not 
possible, provide information on aid flows in formats 
that are compatible with local budget systems, using 
government classification systems and respecting budget 
calendars. 
Support reforms for building effective public finance  »
information systems that can enhance the capacity of 
the government to produce accurate and timely budget 
information. 
Increase technical assistance and funding for civil  »
society, legislatures, and supreme audit institutions 
as part of a comprehensive package of efforts to improve 
budget accountability and oversight. 
Conduct additional research  » on whether donor inter-
ventions and ongoing budget reforms are improving bud-
get transparency in practice, given the noted tendency of 
aid-dependent countries to be less transparent.
Civil society organizations
Use the Open Budget Survey 2008 findings to develop  »
advocacy strategies and to issue specific, construc-
tive suggestions for governments to improve budget 
transparency and public participation in the budget 
process.
Work to enforce existing Freedom of Information  »
laws by using these laws to access budget information 
for analysis and advocacy purposes. 
Produce and disseminate simplified popular versions  »
of key budget documents in languages spoken by the 
majority of the population. 
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Support the work of the legislature and SAI » .  This may 
include providing training and information, acting as 
whistle-blowers, and conducting joint and parallel 
audits.
Advocate for stronger institutional arrangements gov- »
erning the role of legislatures and SAIs in the budget 
process, focusing on strengthening their relations and 
engagement with the public and civil society. 
Work with the media to enhance the quality of cover- »
age of budget issues by providing targeted training and 
timely information. 
Follow up on the Open Budget Survey 2008 »  with 
research that examines the findings in greater detail 
and addresses some of the gaps in existing knowledge 
on budget transparency.
If followed, the above recommendations will significantly 
improve budget transparency and public engagement in 
budget processes.  Ultimately, however, budget monitor-
ing will require the public to have access to detailed bud-
get information, such as information on expenditures at 
individual schools and hospitals, that cannot be provided 
in published budget documentation.  For this reason, the 
public’s right to budget information should be institution-
alized through Freedom of Information laws to ensure 
timely and low-cost access to information for all people. 
In countries where such a law already exists, it should be 




























































































 Open Their Books 
to the Public?
Key
The Open Budget Index evaluates the 
quantity and type of information available 
to the public in a country’s budget  
documents. A country’s placement within  
a performance category was determined 
by averaging the responses to 91 questions 
on the Open Budget Questionnaire related 
to information contained in the eight key  
budget documents that all countries 
should make available to the public.
The countries that scored between 81-100 
percent were placed in the performance 
category Provide Extensive Information, 
those with scores between 61-80 percent 
in Provide Significant Information, those 
with scores between 41-60 percent in 
Provide Some Information, those with 
scores between 21-40 percent in Provide 
Minimal Information, and those with 
scores between 0-20 percent in Provide 
Scant or No Information. All Open Budget 
Questionnaires used to calculate 
these scores may be seen at  
www.openbudgetindex.org.
Provide Extensive Information 
Provide Significant Information 
Provide Some Information 
Provide Minimal Information 









The budget is the government’s most important economic 
policy tool.  It affects the lives of all people, and particularly 
those of poor people.  Yet traditionally the budget process 
has been the exclusive preserve of the executive branch of 
government.  External engagement in the budget process 
by the public—and even by legislatures—was not thought 
to be useful.  Some even thought such participation might 
threaten a country’s fiscal stability.
Much has changed over the past two decades.  It is now 
widely accepted by donors and civil society around the 
world, as well as by an increasing number of govern-
ments, that public access to budget information can help 
to improve accountability, which, in turn, can help to 
make poverty reduction initiatives more effective.  It also 
has been increasingly recognized that budget policies are 
likely to be more appropriate and implementation more 
effective if the public is given opportunities to advocate for 
its priorities and monitor policy implementation.
Meanwhile the capacity of civil society to analyze and 
influence public budgeting has expanded dramatically over 
the past 15 years.  Today, civil society is actively engaged in 
public budget processes in over 100 developing and transi-
tional countries throughout Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, 
and Latin America.
Reflecting these developments, the International Budget 
Partnership (IBP) was established in 1997 to promote civil 
society budget engagement in order to make budget sys-
tems more transparent, accountable, and responsive to the 
needs of poor and low-income people.  As part of its contri-
bution, IBP developed the Open Budget Survey as the first 
independent, comparative survey of budget transparency 
and accountability around the world.
To easily measure the overall commitment of the countries 
surveyed to transparency and to allow for comparisons 
among countries, IBP created the Open Budget Index 
(OBI) from the Survey. The OBI assigns a score to each 
country based on the information it makes available to 
the public throughout the budget process.
Recent research on budget 
transparency and inclusive budgeting 
The Open Budget Survey is part of a limited but growing 
literature on budget transparency and inclusive budget-
ing.  Recent studies have tended to focus on two ques-
tions.  First, they ask whether and how transparency 
leads to improvements in governance and poverty reduc-
tion.  Second, they ask whether and how civil society par-
ticipation in the budget process increases transparency, 
improves governance, and reduces poverty.
The impact of transparency  
on governance and poverty
Most of the recent macro-level, cross-country literature 
on this topic has been generated by research at the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Based on aggregate World Bank data for 169 countries, 
Islam (2003) finds a strong correlation between transpar-
ency (existence of Freedom of Information laws and more 
frequent publication of government economic data) and 
the quality of governance. Further, Bellver and Kaufmann’s 
(2005) results for 20 countries suggest that transparency 
is associated with lower levels of corruption, better socio-
economic and human development indicators, and greater 
economic competitiveness.
Using IMF data, Hameed (2005) finds that, after control-
ling for socioeconomic factors, more transparent coun-
tries tend to have better access to international financial 
markets, stronger fiscal discipline, and lower levels of cor-
ruption.  Similarly, Glennerster and Shin (2008) observe 
an association between greater fiscal transparency and 
improved perceptions of a country’s economic conditions, 
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as measured by lower borrowing costs in sovereign bond 
markets.
There is also a substantial literature on the impact country 
governance has on transparency, particularly in extractive 
industry-dependent countries.  For example, Ross (2001) 
argues that dependency on oil revenues may allow govern-
ments to be less accountable to their publics because they 
are less reliant on direct taxation as a source of revenue. 
Using data from the OBI 2006, de Renzio, Gomez, and 
Sheppard (2009) confirm that natural resource-depen-
dent countries tend to be less transparent.  But they also 
find that an active civil society can help to address the 
problem.  
The role of civil society in promoting 
transparency and better governance
Jenkins and Goetz (1999) document the work of the 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a peasant and 
worker union in the Indian state of Rajasthan.  MKSS 
fought to obtain access to official records on public works 
programs and then organized public hearings where local 
communities audited this information, exposing fraud 
and other forms of corruption.  MKSS’s work contributed 
to the enactment of a national Freedom of Information 
law, as well as the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, in India (Ramkumar 2008).  
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) show that when the 
Ugandan government published increased information 
on basic education grants in the newspapers, community 
organizations were able to use the information to monitor 
the grants and dramatically reduce leakages in the trans-
fers to local government and schools. 
Brautigam’s (2004) study reviews participatory budgeting 
in several countries and finds that greater transparency is 
a necessary condition for increased citizen participation in 
the budget process.  But she also notes that transparency 
must be accompanied by other conditions—such as a clear 
pro-poor agenda by civil society and the political party in 
power and an informed media—for impact on poor com-
munities to occur.    
The IBP and the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex 
University in the U.K. recently carried out six case stud-
ies of budget-focused organizations.  The studies covered 
organizations working in Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Uganda to interpret and disseminate 
budget information (see Robinson 2008, Robinson 2006, 
and de Renzio and Krafchik 2007).  The work of these orga-
nizations enabled broader civil society engagement and a 
stronger role for the legislature in the budget process.  In 
four of the case studies civil society budget work also had 
a direct impact on improving budget systems, pro-poor 
allocations, and the quality of expenditures.
In sum, there is mounting evidence that increased budget 
transparency is associated with better governance stan-
dards and improved economic and social outcomes.  There 
is also evidence that opening budget processes to civil 
society engagement can promote improvements in budget 
accountability and the effectiveness of pro-poor expendi-
tures.  The IBP hopes that the Open Budget Survey will 
contribute to the growing literature on this topic. 
The Open Budget Survey: rationale 
and characteristics  
The IBP initiated the Open Budget Survey in 2006 to assist 
civil society, researchers, and journalists within participat-
ing countries to advocate for greater government budget 
transparency and accountability.  The Open Budget Survey 
2008 updates the results for the 59 countries that were cov-
ered in 2006 and adds 26 countries to the database.  
The Survey is based on a rigorous questionnaire that reflects 
generally accepted good practices related to public finan-
cial management.  Many of the criteria used are similar to 
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those developed by multilateral organizations, such as the 
IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the International Organization 
of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).  
However, IBP believes that the measures developed by 
these organizations do not go far enough.  The Open 
Budget Survey starts from the premise that the public has 
a right to access information on how public funds are col-
lected and used.  This premise leads to several important 
differences between the Survey and the work of the mul-
tilateral organizations.  
First, the Survey is based on research conducted by inde-
pendent civil society experts, rather than by government 
officials or donor agency staff.
Second, the Survey focuses on public access to government 
budget information.  In contrast, other initiatives usually 
focus on the capacity of government to produce budget 
information.  They do not examine whether, how, and to 
whom this information is disseminated.
Third, the Survey includes questions on opportunities for 
public participation in the budget process, as well as ques-
tions related to legislative oversight and the supreme audit 
institution (SAI).  
One limitation of the Survey is that it focuses on national 
government.  It does not examine the availability of infor-
mation at the subnational level.  The Survey also does not 
evaluate the quality or credibility of the information pro-
vided by governments, although it does examine the com-
prehensiveness of this information.  
Overview of the research process
Most of the basic work on the Survey was done by research-
ers in the countries studied.  All researchers who com-
pleted the Open Budget Survey 2008 were from academic 
institutions or civil society organizations (CSOs) and all 
were independent of government and political parties.
The IBP provided one researcher or research organization 
in each of the 85 countries with the Survey questionnaires, 
as well as a Guide to the Open Budget Questionnaire.  The 
guide described the method to be used in completing the 
questionnaire, including defining the types of evidence to 
be provided.  The IBP also was available to answer ques-
tions that researchers had while completing the question-
naire.  The data collection was completed on September 
28, 2007, so no events or developments occurring after 
that date are reflected in the Survey results.
There was a thorough review of each completed question-
naire.  First, IBP staff analyzed each questionnaire, check-
ing internal consistency and cross-referencing answers 
against publicly available data.  The completed question-
naire for each country was then submitted to two peer 
reviewers with knowledge of the country and its budget 
system.  These reviewers were independent of both the gov-
ernment and the research institution that completed the 
questionnaire, and their identities are known only to the 
BOX 1.1 RELATED INITIATIVES TO 
PROMOTE GOOD PRACTICES IN BUDGET 
TRANSPARENCY
The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency was 
published in 1999 to encourage OECD member countries 
to release more comprehensive and accurate fiscal data.  
It was not accompanied by any process or mechanisms 
to monitor and enforce these processes.  The IMF Code of 
Good Practices, first released in 1998, is backed by a process 
for assessing countries’ adherence to its principles, and 
by a lengthy manual to guide such assessments.  The IMF 
Reports on the Observations of Standards and Codes on fiscal 
transparency (also known as Fiscal ROSCs) are part of a 
broader surveillance framework meant to encourage fiscal 
discipline, ensure debt repayment, and encourage foreign 
investment.  In 2005 a group of donors released the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework, 
a tool to assess the overall quality of budget systems.  It 
includes an indicator on budget transparency.
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IBP.  IBP staff subsequently reviewed the peer reviewers’ 
comments for consistency with the methodology.  Where 
necessary, they refereed comments that conflicted with the 
researchers’ answers to decide which response was more 
accurate in terms of the methodology.  Finally, 61 country 
governments were invited to comment on the completed 
questionaire.1 However, only five governments took advan-
tage of this opportunity (El Salvador, Guatemala, Norway, 
South Africa, and Sweden).
Two further tests were undertaken to check the strength of 
the data.  First, the Survey results were compared with the 
results of other indices of governance and transparency. 
The comparison suggested that the Survey is a relatively 
good proxy for broader measures of governance and the 
quality of institutions in the countries covered.  Second, a 
“unanimity score” was calculated for each country, which 
measured the degree of agreement between the researchers 
and the peer reviewers.  There was a very high degree of 
agreement between the researchers and the peer review-
ers in the vast majority of countries covered.  (See Annex 
A for a more detailed explanation of the research process 
and methodology.)
Contents of the Open Budget Survey 
and structure of this report
The Survey focuses on two major concerns:  budget trans-
parency and budget oversight institutions.  
Most of the questions in the Survey focus on the content 
and timeliness of eight key budget documents that all 
countries should issue according to good international 
practices.  Seven of these documents are generally included 
in the good practices for budget transparency promoted 
by multilateral organizations like the OECD, IMF, and 
INTOSAI.  Because of the Survey’s unique emphasis on 
the importance of public participation on increased bud-
get accountability and improved outcomes, the IBP added 
a Citizens Budget—an accessible, simplified version of 
the budget—as the eighth document in its measure of 
transparency.  
The averages calculated from the responses to these ques-
tions form the Open Budget Index 2008, a comparative 
measure of budget transparency.  Chapter two presents 
the main findings of the OBI, and chapter three examines 
the OBI results in greater detail by focusing on each stage 
of the budget process.  
The remaining Survey questions assess the strength of 
key oversight institutions (the legislature and the SAI), as 
well as opportunities for public engagement in the bud-
get process.  These questions reflect IBP’s understanding 
that access to budget information is not the only condi-
tion needed for effective oversight—strong, independent 
institutions and opportunities for public engagement are 
also necessary.  Chapter four presents the findings that 
relate to the legislature and supreme audit institution in 
the budget process.  
The remainder of the report focuses on how to increase 
budget transparency and strengthen oversight.  Chapter 
five describes improvements in a number of countries 
that were included in both the 2006 and 2008 surveys 
and discusses how budget transparency can be improved 
quickly and with modest cost.  Finally, chapter six pres-
ents practical recommendations to governments, donors, 
and civil society for improving budget transparency and 
oversight practices.








According to the OBI 2008, the vast majority of coun-
tries surveyed fail to meet basic benchmarks for budget 
transparency.  This undermines public participation and 
creates opportunities for inappropriate, wasteful, and cor-
rupt spending to flourish, thereby reducing the impact of 
anti-poverty initiatives.
The average score for the OBI 2008 is 39 out of a possible 
100.  This indicates that, on average, countries surveyed 
provide minimal information on their central govern-
ment’s budget and financial activities.
Only five of the 85 countries surveyed—France, New 
Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—provide extensive budget information. 
Three of these five countries publish all eight key docu-
ments, including a Citizens Budget.  France does not pro-
duce a Mid-Year Review.  The United States does not pub-
lish a Pre-Budget Statement, although it disseminates all of 
the relevant pre-budget information in other public docu-
ments. The U.S. also does not publish a Citizens Budget. 
A further 12 countries provide significant information 
on the central government’s budget and financial activi-
ties.  This category includes developed economies, such 
as Norway and Sweden; transitional countries, such as 
Romania; as well as developing countries like Botswana, 
Brazil, and Peru.  Norway, Sweden, and Botswana all fail 
to provide one or more of the eight key budget docu-
ments, while Poland and Peru make seven of the eight 
documents—neither release a Citizens Budget—publicly 
available, but the information provided in them is not 
comprehensive.
The remaining 68 countries surveyed perform poorly on 
the OBI.  The 25 countries that provide scant or no budget 
information are the most serious problem. (See Box 2.2.) 
They include low-income countries like Cambodia, the 
BOX 2.1 WHAT DOES THE OBI MEASURE?
The Open Budget Index scores countries from zero to 100, 
based on a subset of 91 questions from the questionnaire.  
These questions focus on the public availability of eight 
key budget documents (with a particular emphasis on the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal), and on the information they 
contain.  A score of 81-100 indicates that a given country 
provides extensive information in its budget documents, a 
score of 61-80 indicates significant information, 41-60 indi-
cates some information, 21-40 indicates minimal informa-
tion, and zero-20 indicates scant or no information.  
Table 2.1 Distribution of OBI 2008 Scores




(Score of 81-100) 5 86 France, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States
Significant
(Score of 61-80) 12 68
Botswana, Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany, Norway, Peru, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden
Some
(Score of 41-60) 27 51
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kenya, Macedonia, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Zambia
Minimal
(Score of 21-40) 16 34
Albania, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
Scant or no information
(Score of 0-20) 25 7
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé e Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, 
Vietnam, Yemen
Overall 85 39  
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Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Kyrgyz Republic, 
as well as several middle- and high-income countries, such 
as China and Saudi Arabia.  In 23 out of these 25 coun-
tries, the public cannot even access the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal before it is approved by the legislature.  Instead, 
the public is completely shut out from meaningful input 
into the formulation or approval of government budget 
policies, receiving the annual budget as a fait accompli. 
Nicaragua and Nigeria publish the proposed budget as it 
is debated in the legislature, but the information released 
provides the public with only a vague picture of the gov-
ernment’s plans for the upcoming budget year.
The remaining 43 countries fall in the middle.  They pro-
vide some or minimal information on their central gov-
ernments’ budgets and financial activities, but with serious 
limitations.  These countries either fail to make publicly 
available some of the key budget documents, or the docu-
ments they do publish lack important details.
Finally, it is important to note that actual levels of bud-
get transparency in many countries are likely to be even 
lower than indicated by the OBI.  This is because informa-
tion on some public funds and state-owned enterprises is 
not included in the government’s budget documents. (See 
Box 2.3.)
Characteristics of poor performers
Countries that perform poorly on the OBI tend to share 
a number of characteristics, which may point to some of 
the causes and consequences of the lack of budget trans-
parency.  The worst performers are mostly located in the 
Middle East and North Africa, and in sub-Saharan Africa. 
They also tend to be low-income countries and often 
depend heavily on revenues from foreign aid or oil and gas 
exports.  Many of them have weak democratic institutions 
or are governed by autocratic regimes.  However, within 
each of these categories there are countries that perform 
very well, showing that greater budget transparency is pos-
sible in a wide range of different contexts.
Geographical region 
The region with the lowest average OBI score is the Middle 
East and North Africa, with an average score of 24 and 
with five out of seven countries releasing minimal or scant 
or no information.  Within this group, Jordan scores well 
above its regional counterparts, but even its score is only 
52 out of a possible 100.
BOX 2.2 WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SCORE 
LESS THAN 10 ON THE OBI?
Of the 85 countries included in the OBI 2008, 17 score in the 
single digits, and five countries have a score of zero.  Chad, 
for example, scores only 7 out of 100.  Because the govern-
ment does not make the Executive’s Budget Proposal 
available to the public, Chadians do not have a compre-
hensive picture of the government’s plans for taxing and 
spending for the upcoming year.  Moreover, it is difficult to 
track spending, revenue collection, and borrowing during 
the year, since execution reports are not published or lack 
important details.  Also, public expenditures in Chad are 
not regularly audited.  This makes it impossible to assess 
whether budget data are reliable and comply with legisla-
tion.  Finally, Chadians are unlikely to get access to the 
detailed budget information needed to track individual 
programs and activities because Chad has not codified the 
right to access government information into law.
BOX 2.3 OFF-BUDGET ACTIVITIES CAN REDUCE TRANSPARENCY
In Venezuela (OBI score of 35) at least one quarter of the total annual budget is not reported in the official budget documents, according 
to the researchers.  Nicaragua (OBI score of 18) also keeps a significant proportion of the budget out of the official consolidated budget 
presentation, including money the government receives from Venezuela.  Civil society researchers in Nicaragua reported that undis-
closed revenues, and the expenditures arising from them, amount to between US$100 million and US$500 million per year (five to 20 




Sub-Saharan African countries also generally register 
poor performance.  More than two thirds of the countries 
surveyed from this region release minimal or scant or no 
information—and the average score for the region is only 
25.  Botswana and South Africa are the strong performers 
in sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana’s score is 62, while South 
Africa has a score of 87 and is among the most transparent 
countries included in the OBI 2008.  If we remove these two 
top performers, the average OBI score for the sub-Saharan 
Africa region falls to a disappointing 20.
Level of income
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the OBI 2008 
countries and their level of income (measured by GDP per 
capita).   The upward sloping line in the figure represents 
the average relationship between a country’s income and 
its OBI score.  
The scatterplot shows that for many of the countries in 
the sample there is a positive relationship between a coun-
try’s OBI score and its level of income.2 Countries that 
score high on the OBI generally are countries that have a 
Table 2.2 Open Budget Index 2008 by Region
Region Number of Countries Average OBI Score
East Asia & Pacific 12 39
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 17 50
Latin America & Caribbean 15 39
Middle East & North Africa 7 24
South Asia 6 42
Sub-Saharan Africa 22 25
Western Europe & the U.S. 6 80
2. One way to quantitatively measure the relationship between countries’ OBI score and their level of income is a measure known as a correlation coefficient.  A correlation 
coefficient varies between 0 and 1—with a score of 1 indicating a perfect relationship.  The correlation coefficient for the above scatterplot is reasonably high at 0.5278.
FIGURE 2.1
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relatively high level of income (see for example, the U.K. 
France, U.S., and Norway).  On the other hand, countries 
with low OBI scores tend to have low levels of income (see 
for example, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyz Republic, Chad, and 
Liberia). 
However, there are significant outliers.  For instance, 
in spite of their considerable wealth, Saudi Arabia and 
Equatorial Guinea both perform very poorly on the OBI—
registering scores of one and zero, respectively.  In contrast, 
among lower-income countries, Peru and Sri Lanka both 
provide their citizens with a significant amount of budget 
information.  In other words, a country’s level of income 
does not predetermine its level of transparency. 
Dependency on foreign aid  
Countries that perform poorly on the OBI also tend to 
depend heavily on significant amounts of foreign aid to 
finance public spending.  The average score for the 30 
countries that received more than 5 percent of their Gross 
National Income (GNI) in foreign aid in recent years is 
24, compared with a score of 62 for countries that did not 
receive any foreign aid over the same period.  There
 is also evidence that budget transparency worsens as aid 
dependency increases, as shown in table 2.3. 
This apparent relationship may simply reflect the fact that 
aid-dependent countries are aid-dependent because of 
their low-income status, and low-income countries tend 
to be less transparent.   On the other hand, aid depen-
dency can make accountability to donors more impor-
tant than accountability to the public, thus undermining 
transparency. 
However, the pattern is interesting because in many of 
these countries donors have provided substantial techni-
cal and financial assistance to improve financial manage-
ment systems.  Given the poor OBI performance of many 
recipients of significant amounts of aid, this is an area that 
certainly deserves further research.
Dependency on natural resource revenues
The OBI 2008 confirms that countries that are dependent 
on oil and gas revenues tend to be less transparent.  Table 
2.4 shows the average OBI scores for countries with sig-
nificant natural resource endowments.
Table 2.3 Aid Dependency and Budget Transparency*







(Aid >10% of GNI) 18 22
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Honduras, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Mongolia, Nicaragua,  Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Medium 
(Aid >5% and <10% of GNI) 12 28
Albania, Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Georgia, Jordan, Macedonia, 
Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Vietnam 
Low 
(Aid <5% of GNI)
45 45
Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Fiji, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen 
Overall 75 32  
Source: World Development Indicators (Aid/GNI average for period 2000-2006)




Lack of budget transparency is particularly serious in the 
21 oil and gas producing countries.  Their average score 
is 23, which compares very poorly with both the overall 
average OBI score of 39 and with the average score of 44 
for countries that depend on mineral resource revenues. 
(See Box 2.4.)
Further, the OBI results show that performance varies 
significantly even among oil and gas producing countries. 
For example, Columbia, Norway, and Mexico all perform 
fairly strongly.  This result supports suggestions that fall-
ing victim to the “resource curse”—negative economic, 
social, and political outcomes associated with significant 
natural resource exports—is not an inevitable consequence 
of hydrocarbon wealth. 
Political System
All of the 17 countries that provide extensive or signifi-
cant budget information are regarded as democracies 
to one degree or another.  For example, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracies classifies nine of 
the 17 as full democracies and eight as flawed democracies. 
In contrast, the EIU classifies two of the 25 countries that 
provide scant or no information as flawed democracies, six 
as hybrid regimes, and 15 as authoritarian regimes.  One 
was not classified.3
Conclusions
In summary, governments in the vast majority of countries 
included in the OBI 2008 fail to provide their publics with 
sufficient information to ensure effective accountability for 
the use of public funds.  In addition, while many of the least 
transparent countries share a number of interconnected 
characteristics, the OBI 2008 shows that no one set of cir-
cumstances predetermines transparency performance.
Table 2.4  Natural Resource Dependency and Budget Transparency
Nature of Resource Dependency Number of Countries
Average 
OBI Score Countries
Mineral (Coal, copper, diamonds, gold, 
platinum, silver and/or tin) 13 44
Botswana, Dem. Rep. of Congo,* Ghana, Indonesia,* 
Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Mongolia, Namibia, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Zambia
Hydrocarbon 21 23
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, São Tomé e Príncipe, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen
Overall for Resource Dependent Countries 34 31  
*DRC and Indonesia are also oil producers, but their dependency on mineral production is more significant.
Source: IMF Guide for Revenue Transparency 2007, based on data for 2000 to 2005.
Countries are considered rich in hydrocarbons and/or mineral resources on the basis of the following criteria:
(i) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal revenue of at least 25 percent during the period 2000-2005 or
(ii) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds in total export proceeds of at least 25 percent during the period 2000-2005.
3. Kekic, Laza. “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.” Downloaded from http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf
on 7 January 2009.
BOX 2.4 LACK OF TRANSPARENCY FUELS 
CORRUPTION IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA
The small West African country of Equatorial Guinea (EG) 
scores zero on the OBI 2008.  The sharp increase in EG’s oil 
exports over the last decade has made it one of the richest 
countries in Africa   However, this dramatic growth in wealth 
has not led to improvements in the living conditions of the 
general population.  This is likely the result of corruption.  
Control of EG’s national treasury—including the revenues 
that flow into the national oil company (GEPetrol) and the 
national gas company (SONAGAS)—is highly concentrated 
in the hands of the country’s dictatorial ruler Teodoro  
Obiang Nguema Mbasago and his relatives.  A 2004 U.S. 
Senate investigation revealed that President Obiang’s family 
had more than 60 accounts with the Washington, DC-based 
Riggs Bank.  Bank officials recorded extravagant purchases 
made from those accounts and questionable payments 
into them from oil companies (e.g., Exxon Mobil, Amerada 
Hess, Marathon Oil, and Chevron Texaco).  The purchases 
included a US$2.6 million mansion paid for in cash and an 
eight-bedroom, 14,995 square-foot oceanfront mansion on 
15.77 acres in Malibu, CA, listed at US$35 million.
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This chapter examines the OBI 2008 results in greater 
detail by focusing on information provided to the public 
at each stage of the budget process. 
If provided with adequate data and opportunities to par-
ticipate in the budget process, civil society and the public 
can significantly and positively impact budget outcomes. 
This chapter includes text boxes that illustrate this by 
describing the activities of CSOs in different countries at 
each stage of the budget process.   
The budget process consists of four main phases: 1) formu-
lation, when the budget proposal is drafted by the execu-
tive branch of government; 2) approval, when the budget 
is debated and approved by the legislative branch; 3) execu-
tion, when the budget’s plans for generating revenues and 
spending are implemented; and 4) evaluation and audit, 
when funds spent are assessed for compliance and, ideally, 
for performance. The diagram below indicates which of the 
eight key budget documents should be produced at each 
stage of the process.
Throughout the budget process, governments should make 
information available in the eight key budget documents 
presented in Table 3.1. This chapter will discuss the 
importance of each document and its related OBI 2008 
findings.
Civil society access to key 
budget documents throughout 
the budget cycle
Budget Formulation 
During budget formulation, the government determines 
the amount of revenues to be collected, the allocation of 
expenditures, and the levels of deficit and debt for the 
coming fiscal year.  Civil society engagement at this stage 
is critical.  
Decisions at this stage not only determine the overall size 
of the budget and major allocations between departments 
and programs for the upcoming fiscal year but also may 
influence budgets several years into the future.  Because 
most legislatures have limited powers to change proposed 
budgets, the formulation stage is often the final oppor-
tunity for civil society to influence major priorities and 
allocations for the coming budget year, and sometimes 
beyond.  
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Unfortunately, the OBI 2008 results suggest that the bud-
get formulation process remains closed in most of the 
countries surveyed. 
Of the 85 countries in the Survey, only 30 make a Pre-
Budget Statement publicly available.  In 12 of these coun-
tries only partial information is provided.  Almost two 
thirds of the countries (55) do not publish a Pre-Budget 
Statement at all.   
While the Pre-Budget Statement outlines the fiscal and 
economic framework for the upcoming year, it is the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal that presents the govern-
ment’s actual policy priorities and planned activities. 
The OBI 2008 finds that only six countries publish all the 
information in this key document that is required by good 
practices.  A further 17 countries publish a proposal with 
significant information.  In contrast, 62 countries publish 
Executive’s Budget Proposals with limited to no support-
ing information.  
Thus the OBI 2008 clearly shows that most countries do 
not provide sufficient information to allow civil society to 
engage meaningfully in the formative stage of the budget 
process.  This denies civil society critical opportunities to 
have input on the major assumptions underlying the bud-
get, the key macro-policy issues, and the setting of major 
priorities.  Nevertheless, in some countries government 
and civil society have begun to find ways to make the for-
mulation process more consultative. (See Box 3.1.)
  
Budget Approval
The budget approval stage begins when the executive for-
mally submits its annual budget proposal to the legislature. 
In most countries the legislature then debates the budget 
and may hold public hearings on specific proposals in 
specialist committees.  The approval stage ends when the 
legislature enacts the budget into law. 
Table 3.1 Amount of Information Made Available Varies by Budget Documents
Countries 
Providing 
Scant or No 























Statement 55 0 4 8 18
Executive’s 
Budget Proposal 24 10 28 17 6
Enacted Budget 4 11 0 30 40
Citizens Budget 68 4 0 3 10
In-Year Reports 21 5 10 22 27
Mid-Year Review 63 5 4 3 10
Year-End Report 37 18 14 11 5
Audit Report 32 8 13 11 21
GOOD PRACTICES DURING 
BUDGET FORMULATION
A Pre-Budget Statement should be issued at least one 
month before the executive submits the budget proposal 
to the legislature.  It should present the assumptions used 
in developing the budget; expected revenue, expendi-
ture, and debt levels; and the broad allocations between 
sectors.
The Executive’s Budget Proposal is the result of the 
formulation stage.  It presents the government’s detailed 
declaration of the policies and priorities it wants to pursue 
in the upcoming budget year, including specific alloca-
tions to each ministry and agency.  It should be submitted 
to the legislature at least three months prior to the start of 
the fiscal year to allow for proper review.
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In countries where the legislature plays a more active role 
in the budget process, CSOs may be asked to provide expert 
testimony at hearings and can influence budget decisions 
through targeted advocacy. (See Box 3.2.)    
Almost all countries (81) surveyed make the budget pub-
licly available once it has been approved.  However, in four 
countries—China, Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and 
Sudan—even the Enacted Budget is not made public.  In 
total, 70 countries provide either extensive or significant 
information on the Enacted Budget, and only 11 coun-
tries provide minimal to no information.  The generally 
good performance on making the Enacted Budget publicly 
available is an important, positive finding.  As long as the 
Enacted Budget is published, it is possible for civil society 
to engage in some level of monitoring how the budget is 
executed.   
Citizens Budgets are important instruments to more 
broadly disseminate budget information and generate 
greater understanding and engagement in the budget pro-
cess.  Of the 85 countries in the OBI 2008, 68 do not publish 
such a document, even though it would require no further 
data or analysis to produce.  However, 17 developed and 
developing countries do produce a Citizens Budget, with 
Croatia, El Salvador, South Korea, and Ukraine among 
those that have recently started doing so.  Several coun-
tries also post these online.4  In some countries govern-
ments and civil society collaborate in producing Citizens 
Budgets.  
Budget Execution
The execution phase of the budget process is when funds 
are actually spent to implement the policies, programs, 
and projects outlined in the budget.  In practice, budgets 
are seldom executed exactly as approved.  
Deviations between planned and actual expenditures can 
occur for legitimate reasons, such as explicit changes in 
policy or in reaction to changing economic conditions. 
GOOD PRACTICES DURING  
BUDGET APPROVAL
The budget should be enacted prior to the start of the 
fiscal year.  The Enacted Budget should then be made 
publicly available, as it is the legal document that  
authorizes the executive to implement the policy mea-
sures the budget contains.  
The budget is usually a lengthy, technical document.  
Thus governments should also publish a Citizens  
Budget, a simplified summary of the budget in lan-
guages and through media that are widely accessible  
to the public.
BOX 3.1 CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET FORMULATION STAGE
There are both government- and civil society-led initiatives to open the formulation process to public participation.  In 1989 the munici-
pal government of Porte Alegre, Brazil, introduced participatory budgeting, in which government convenes forums to involve the public 
directly in decisions about allocating the available resources in the municipality’s investment budget.  The practice has been adapted 
and replicated in over 100 municipalities in Brazil and in several other countries around the world.  Results from Brazil indicate that 
participatory budgeting can lead to improved public engagement and investment allocations that benefit low-income communities 
over middle- and upper-income communities (See UNHABITAT, 2004).  Civil society organizations like the Brazilian Centro de Assessoria e 
Estudos Urbanos (CIDADE) have played an active role in promoting and monitoring participatory budgeting exercises. 
Civil society-led efforts to pry open the drafting stage include attempts to influence the priorities driving budget decision making.  In 
Kenya the Institute for Economic Affairs coordinates an annual civil society meeting that culminates in a report to the government on a 
set of agreed upon priorities.  In Uganda the Uganda Debt Network conveys the results of their community-based monitoring teams to 
national policy forums, such as Sector Working Groups, in order to influence national budget priorities.  Both of these initiatives draw on 
civil society’s direct relationships with communities to enrich discussions on national priorities and have been formally incorporated into 
the decision-making process in both countries.
4. For example, see those produced by governments of New Zealand (http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2007/execsum); 
India (http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ub2007-08/keybudget.htm); and South Africa (http://www.finance.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2007/guide.pdf).
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However, deviations can also occur for negative reasons, 
including poor financial management, unauthorized 
expenditures, inefficiency, and fraud.  In many countries, 
such weaknesses in execution are as large a problem as 
inadequate funding.  That is why having timely, accurate, 
accessible, and useful information during budget execu-
tion is so important and can enable civil society to augment 
government monitoring capacity. (See Box 3.3.)  
The OBI 2008 finds that performance on budget execu-
tion information is mixed, but poor overall.   While 20 
countries publish all three relevant reports, 39 publish 
two of them, and 15 countries publish only one of them. 
Eleven countries (Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, 
São Tome e Principé, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Trinidad 
and Tobago) do not release any execution reports to the 
public at all.
Table 3.2 shows that OBI countries perform somewhat 
better on in-year reporting than on mid-year or year-end 
reporting.  However, the amount of information in In-Year 
Reports varies widely, and only 27 of the 85 countries 
provide comprehensive budget execution information in 
these reports.  
Very few countries provide extensive information in their 
Mid-Year Reviews and Year-End Reports (10 and five, 
respectively).  Of particular concern are the countries not 
publishing Mid-Year Reviews or Year-End Reports at all 
(63 and 21, respectively).
GOOD PRACTICES DURING  
BUDGET EXECUTION
There are three documents that governments should 
publish during the course of budget execution.  First, 
the executive should issue monthly or quarterly In-Year 
Reports on revenues collected, expenditures made, and 
debt incurred.  These allow citizens to monitor whether 
the government is spending as much as promised on key 
sectors, as well as whether these funds are reaching the 
targeted institutions and beneficiaries.  Second, the exec-
utive should publish a Mid-Year Review to discuss any 
changes in economic assumptions that affect approved 
budget policies.  For example, an unexpected change in 
the price of oil and gas can lead to huge revenue wind-
falls or shortfalls in resource-rich countries.  Third, the 
executive should issue a Year-End Report summarizing 
the situation at the end of the fiscal year.  The Year-End 
Report should include an update on progress in achiev-
ing the policy goals in the Enacted Budget.
BOX 3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET APPROVAL STAGE
As discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, the quality of the legislature’s oversight is often handicapped by limited budget literacy and 
access to independent research.  Civil society organizations can enhance the work of the legislature by producing accessible guides to 
the budget, providing training and technical assistance, and undertaking independent analyses of the budget. Often the value of civil 
society analysis is its unique focus on the impact of the budget on poor and marginalized communities.  
In countries with stronger legislatures, CSOs can affect budget decisions through their support to legislatures.  For instance, the 
U.S.-based California Budget Project (CBP) helped prevent enactment of state corporate tax cuts that would have primarily benefited 
technology, film, and entertainment corporations, while reducing resources available for programs targeted at poor and low-income 
communities.   
Under the proposal, known as “single sales factor,” companies that have production facilities and employees in California would have 
to pay minimal or no state corporate taxes if they sell most or all of their products or services outside of California.  Since this was a 
complicated proposal, the analysis and chartbook prepared by the CBP was critical in helping legislators and advocacy organizations 
understand the policy and its potential consequences.  CBP staff devoted a significant amount of time to educating policymakers and 
explaining the impact on public services if the proposal were enacted.  Despite the state’s multi-billion dollar budget shortfall, the 
Assembly passed more than $1 billion in corporate tax reductions, including the “single sales factor” policy, when it approved the state 
budget in July.  However, the State Senate refused to approve the tax measure when it approved the final spending plan in August, and 
the proposal died.
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Budget Evaluation and Audit
The final stage in the budget cycle is when there is an 
assessment of whether public resources have been used 
appropriately and effectively.  The public can use this infor-
mation to call for improved systems and punishment of 
those responsible for corrupt actions. (See box 3.4.)   
The OBI results show that transparency at this stage is 
rather poor.  In 27 of the countries surveyed, the Audit 
Report is not made publicly available at all.  In six of 
these countries—Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, 
Morocco, Niger, and Serbia—Audit Reports are not even 
produced (see chapter 5).  Nevertheless, 21 countries pub-
lish comprehensive Audit Reports.  These countries span 
diverse contexts, again demonstrating that good perfor-
mance can be achieved in most situations, if the political 
will exists.
Delays in releasing Audit Reports reduce the opportunities 
for civil society to use audit information to advocate for 
improvements in government performance.  Unfortunately, 
48 countries do not publish Audit Reports within the rec-
ommended timeframe.  For instance, Mexico, India, and 
Romania all release their Audit Reports more than 12 
months after the end of the fiscal year.
Table 3.2 Number of Countries Producing Budget Execution Reports
Comprehensive Partial Not Available
In-Year Reports 27 40 18
Mid-Year Review 10 12 63
Year-End Report 5 59 21
GOOD PRACTICES DURING 
BUDGET EVALUATION & AUDIT
Best practice requires that a body that is independent 
from the executive issue an annual Audit Report.  The 
supreme audit institution (SAI) should report its findings 
annually to the legislature, as well as to the general pub-
lic. Audit Reports should cover all activities undertaken 
by the executive, although guidelines from the United 
Nations International Organization of Supreme Auditing 
Institutions (INTOSAI) allows for the exclusion of cases 
involving “interests worthy of protection or protected by 
law.” The Audit Report should be issued within 12 months 
of the end of the fiscal year.
BOX 3.3 CIVIL SOCIETY INTERVENTIONS IN THE BUDGET EXECUTION STAGE
In 2002 the Mexican Chamber of Deputies approved a substantial increase in funding for women’s health programs.  Subsequently, the 
president of the Budget Committee requested the Minister of Health to divert part of this increase to eight nongovernmental Centres to 
Assist Women.  The request created an uproar in Congress and a network of six civil society institutions was formed to address this issue.  
The network took advantage of the powers of the independent body established to enforce the 2003 Right to Information law to obtain 
detailed information on the use of the funds.  
FUNDAR, a Mexican budget-focused organization, showed that the Centres were in fact linked to an organization (Provida) whose pro-
grams ran counter the Mexican government’s policies on HIV/AIDS.  It also found that 90 percent of the funds allocated to these Centres 
were blatantly misused—most of the payments were not invoiced and went to “ghost” organizations that shared the same address as 
Provida.  Subsequent investigations by the government’s internal and external auditors upheld FUNDAR’s findings.  The internal auditor 
imposed a large fine on Provida, and the organization was required to return the funds it had received and was barred from receiving 
public funds for 15 years.
The Open Budget Survey 2008 28
Conclusions
At each stage of the budget process, the information made 
publicly available determines the ability of civil society (as 
well as the media, legislatures, and supreme audit institu-
tions) to influence, monitor, and assess the effectiveness of 
government policies.
The detailed results of the OBI 2008 reveal uneven patterns 
of transparency at the different stages of the budget process. 
Most countries included in the survey publish the annual 
budget approved by the legislature, allowing for some level 
of civil society engagement in the rest of the budget process. 
However, the budget formulation stage, where most major 
policy and resource allocation decisions are taken, remains 
quite closed, and the availability of information during the 
execution and evaluation phases is very limited.  As the text 
boxes in this chapter show, this undermines the potential 
contribution of civil society to enhancing the priorities, 
allocations, and value received from public spending, and 
to identifying dishonest practices, as well.
BOX 3.4 CIVIL SOCIETY INTERVENTIONS IN THE BUDGET AUDIT STAGE
Members of the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) in the Philippines were shocked to see a newspaper adver-
tisement issued by the Ministry of Public Works declaring that it had successfully completed 27 projects in Abra province.  Knowing this 
was not true, CCAGG members gathered detailed documentation on the actual state of the projects that had been declared completed.  
An official government audit concurred with CCAGG’s findings, and several officials were charged with corruption and eventually sus-
pended for misconduct.
Some civil society organizations have taken measures to publicize the findings of Audit Reports in order to hold government account-
able for managing public funds.  One such organization, HakiElimu in Tanzania, created a set of leaflets that presented the findings of 
recent Audit Reports in an attractive and accessible manner and shared them with the media, executive branch officials, legislators, and 
civil society partners.  The first round of leaflets, issued in 2006, proved extremely successful, and the controller and auditor general 
provided significantly more cooperation with the project when it was repeated in 2007.
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The Open Budget Survey 2008 included questions on the 
ability of the legislature and SAI to provide effective over-
sight.  The responses to these questions were averaged to 
create two indices that measure the overall strength of the 
legislature and SAI.5  Though they are less comprehensive 
than the OBI, given the Survey included fewer questions 
on oversight institutions than it did on public access to 
information, the indices nevertheless provide a useful 
overview of the situation across the 85 countries.
The results show that the oversight capacity of legislatures 
and SAIs is undermined by several serious constraints 
in the majority of countries surveyed.  While the previ-
ous chapters described how lack of access to informa-
tion prevents the public from participating directly in 
the budget process, here we examine the problems that 
legislatures and SAIs face in indirectly representing the 
public’s interests.   
Effective accountability depends not only on trans-
parency but also on the strength of these institutions. 
Unfortunately, the Survey finds that the countries with the 
weakest legislatures and SAIs also tend be those that score 
lowest on the OBI.  Thus budget oversight in each of these 
countries is frustrated by both limited access to informa-
tion and weak formal oversight institutions.  
Key findings for legislatures
The legislature’s role in the budget process varies by coun-
try.  Typically, the legislature is empowered to approve 
budget legislation, authorize the collection and spending 
of government revenues, and analyze audited accounts 
to determine whether the government has delivered on 
its budget promises.  In most cases, the legislature also 
has the power to amend the budget proposal submitted 
by the executive.  
The average 2008 score for “strength of legislature” is 42 
out of a possible 100.  A critical factor contributing to this 
overall score is whether the legislature has adequate time 
to carefully consider the Executive’s Budget Proposal. The 
OECD recommends that the executive provide a detailed 
budget proposal to the legislature at least three months 
prior to the start of the fiscal year.  However, less than half 
of all countries surveyed (32 out of 85) meet this deadline. 
In 17 countries the budget proposal is received less than 
six weeks before the start of the budget year, preventing a 
thorough legislative review.
Given the limited time legislatures have to review the bud-
get proposal, it is not surprising that 66 of 85 countries 
surveyed do not hold public hearings in which civil soci-
ety organizations can testify on the budgets of individual 
5. See Annex A for a detailed explanation of how these sub-indices were constructed.
BOX 4.1 CIVIL SOCIETY CAN STRENGTHEN 
THE WORK OF THE LEGISLATURE
Civil society organizations specializing in budget issues 
help to build legislatures’ capacity in several ways.  For 
example, CSOs in India, Mexico, Croatia, and elsewhere 
prepare accessible summaries and guides to their countries’ 
national budgets.  Upon receiving the first CSO-produced 
guide to the Croatian budget, one member of the legis-
lature exclaimed to the Deputy Minister of Finance, “Now 
we don’t have to (only) listen to you anymore, we have (our 
own) guide!”  
Civil society organizations also provide training and techni-
cal assistance to boost legislatures’ budget literacy and the 
quality of budget hearings and reports.  The Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), for example, partnered 
with a multinational accounting firm to provide training 
and technical support to all specialist committees in provin-
cial legislatures in South Africa.   
Finally, civil society provides valuable independent analyses 
of the budget.  Given the limited capacity available to 
analyze budgets in many developing countries, CSO 
analyses focusing on the impact of the budget on poor and 
marginalized communities often constitute the few acces-
sible, timely, and critical interpretations of the budget.  For 
instance, gender budgeting initiatives in South Africa and 
Tanzania have enabled legislators to draw on research skills 
in civil society, while giving CSOs direct access to policy 
makers.  Similar initiatives, highlighting the impact of the 
budget on women, children, and people with disabilities 
have been replicated in many countries around the world.   
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government departments.  Similarly, 67 of the 85 countries 
do not hold public hearings in which CSOs can testify on 
the macroeconomic and fiscal framework of the govern-
ment’s budget.  
Moving on to budget execution, in 49 of the 85 coun-
tries surveyed the executive does not seek approval from 
the legislature when it shifts funds between administra-
tive units.  This seriously limits the legislature’s power to 
ensure that scarce public funds are spent in line with the 
approved budget.   
Furthermore, in almost one third of the countries (27 of 
85) the legislature does not have the opportunity to approve 
supplemental budgets until after the funds are spent.  This 
is particularly problematic in countries with large and fre-
quent supplemental budget requests—such as the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Malawi, Mexico, Sudan, and Yemen.  This prac-
tice allows governments to use supplemental budgets to 
hide controversial or unpopular spending.  
Key findings for SAIs
The name, structure, and functions of the SAI vary across 
countries.6  In general, SAIs are tasked with verifying 
government accounts to ensure the proper use of public 
funds, compliance with existing legislation, and adherence 
to sound financial management practices.  In most coun-
tries, the SAI is required to submit findings and recom-
mendations to the national legislature, which may have a 
committee that is mandated to review audit findings (often 
called the “public accounts committee”).
The average score for “strength of SAI” is 45 out of a pos-
sible 100, only marginally higher than the average score 
for legislatures.  
One of the most important measures of an SAI’s ability to 
provide effective oversight is its independence from the 
executive branch.  Unfortunately, in 26 countries surveyed 
the executive can remove the head of the SAI from office 
without the consent of either the legislature or the judi-
ciary.   Furthermore, in 38 of the 85 countries the executive, 
not the legislature or the judiciary, determines the yearly 
budget allocation for the SAI.  In 24 of these countries the 
Survey’s civil society researchers felt that funding for the 
SAI was below the level of resources needed to fulfill its 
mandate.  Legal and financial dependence on the execu-
tive may cause the head of the SAI to withhold reports 
that are critical.
SAIs’ mandates usually prevent them from playing a direct 
policy or political role.  As a result, for its audits to have 
practical impact, the legislature needs to follow up on the 
SAI’s findings and recommendations.  However, in 17 of 
the countries surveyed the legislature does not follow up 
on the work of the SAI at all, while in a further 20 coun-
tries, legislative follow-up is minimal.   
Furthermore, in 64 countries, the executive does not 
BOX 4.2 CIVIL SOCIETY CAN 
STRENGTHEN THE WORK OF SAIs
In some countries, civil society organizations have worked 
with the SAI to conduct complementary or joint audits.  
CSOs can also help to publicize the findings of Audit 
Reports, encouraging follow-up, and they can suggest top-
ics for audit investigations.
For example, in 2007 the Honduran Tribunal Superior de 
Cuentas (the national SAI) began a pilot program to solicit 
greater public participation in its audits.  It selected eight 
agencies, including hospitals, schools, and municipalities, 
for audits based on public inputs received at a meeting the 
SAI organized.  Subsequently, the SAI sought and received 
public complaints about the functioning of these agencies.  
The SAI investigated these complaints and incorporated 
their findings into its Audit Reports.  The Audit Reports 
were discussed at another public meeting organized by 
the SAI, which was attended by officials from the audited 
entities, who were asked to respond to the audit findings.
An assessment of the initiative found that public inputs 
led to a large number of the audit findings reported from 
these pilot audits and likely would not have been identified 
through a regular audit investigation.
6. Almost every country legally mandates the existence of an entity to oversee public accounts. Known generally as the supreme audit institution, this entity may be known 
as the Office of the Auditor-General, Board of Audits, or Court of Accounts.  In the United States, the SAI is the Government Accountability Office and is headed by the 
Comptroller General. 
4.0 The Legislature and Suprem
e Audit Institution
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reveal what steps, if any, it has taken to address audit 
recommendations.   In addition, neither the SAI nor the 
legislature report to the public on actions taken by the 
executive to address audit recommendations in 64 coun-
tries.  This makes it easier for government to ignore audit 
recommendations.  
In many countries, the SAI has some procedures in place 
to tap the public as a source of information. (See Box 4.2 
for an example from Honduras.)  In 46 countries surveyed, 
the SAI maintains formal mechanisms of communication 
with the public to receive complaints and suggestions on 
the agencies, programs, or projects that it should audit. 
However, in 31 countries, the SAI has limited decision-
making power over what it will audit.  Thus, even though 
the channels for engaging civil society might exist, a sig-
nificant number of SAIs might not be able to use this infor-
mation effectively.
Lack of transparency and weak 
oversight institutions
As Table 4.1 shows, the countries with the weakest over-
sight institutions tend to cluster in the same regions as 
those with the lowest OBI scores.  Thus the Middle East and 
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa regions score poorly 
on the overall OBI, as well as on the questions related to 
legislatures and SAIs.  However, South Asia also fares quite 
badly with respect to the strength of legislatures, though 
it performs better on the OBI.
These findings are disappointing since effective formal 
oversight institutions are most necessary in those countries 
where public access to information is limited.  The Survey 
findings indicate that in many countries the public is effec-
tively excluded from both direct and indirect participation 
in the budget process.
As with the OBI, it is worth noting that there are some 
good performers with respect to the strength of formal 
oversight institutions within poorly performing regions. 
For instance, Zambia and South Africa register 53 and 73 
respectively for SAI strength—significantly higher than 
the average for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  In both 
countries the SAI enjoys a fair amount of independence—
the heads of the SAI may only be removed by the legislature 
or judiciary, and the SAIs have full discretion to decide 
which audits to undertake.  
South Africa also fares rather well in terms of legislative 
strength, scoring 67 out of 100.  This reflects the fact that 
South Africa’s Ministry of Finance holds extensive consul-
tations with a wide range of legislators as part of its pro-
cess for determining budget priorities.  In addition, South 
Africa’s legislature holds public hearings on the Medium 
Term Budget Policy Statement, as well as on the individual 
budgets of central government administrative units (min-
istries, departments, and agencies).
Table 4.1 Strength of Oversight Institutions by Region
Region Legislative Strength SAI strength OBI
East Asia & the Pacific 41 53 39
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 48 57 50
Latin America & the Caribbean 40 47 39
Middle East & North Africa 27 21 24
South Asia 32 41 42
Sub-Saharan Africa 35 29 25
Western Europe & the U.S. 78 84 80





As with most institutional change processes, sustainable 
improvements in budget transparency are likely to take 
considerable time.  Increasing transparency can involve 
reforming laws, regulations, rules, and procedures, as well 
as changing practices.  Such processes can be painfully 
slow and may encounter many setbacks, including politi-
cal meddling.  Yet, the Open Budget Survey shows that it 
is possible for budget transparency to improve rapidly in 
a variety of contexts, through a combination of political 
will, civil society pressure, and other internal and exter-
nal factors.
This chapter highlights improvements recorded in budget 
transparency between 2006 and 2008 and discusses how 
countries that continue to perform poorly might begin to 
realize similar improvements.  Given that the Survey will 
be repeated every two years, it will provide data to track 
progress over time and identify strategies for increasing 
transparency.
Significant improvements since 2006
Of the 59 countries that were surveyed in both 2006 and 
2008, the great majority saw their overall budget transpar-
ency score change, mostly in a positive direction.  The only 
two countries whose score did not change were the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand.
The average OBI 2008 score for the 59 countries that were 
also included in the OBI 2006 is 48—a slight improve-
ment over the average OBI 2006 score of 46 for the same 
countries.7   
The changes between 2006 and 2008 can be attributed to 
three factors.  In some cases, they reflect significant changes 
in the degree of budget transparency, stemming from shifts 
in government policies and procedures or from wider 
political transitions.  In other cases, they relate to smaller 
changes in the kinds of budget documents that govern-
ments make available to the public or in the information 
that the documents contain.  Finally, score changes can 
also be due to researchers’ improved understanding and 
a stricter application of the Survey methodology, leading 
to partial reassessments.
While this chapter focuses on some of the countries with 
significant changes, Box 5.1 notes several countries that 
have had smaller but promising improvements in budget 
transparency.   The results presented here are preliminary. 
IBP intends to investigate each of these cases more care-
fully over the next year to understand the factors that drive 
change or that may reverse these improvements.  
These positive changes are encouraging.  The IBP is pleased 
to report that several governments are increasingly recog-
nizing the importance of releasing budget information to 
the public.  These are exactly the types of developments 
that the Survey hopes to document for many more coun-
tries in the future.  
However, many of the improving countries still could do 
much more to enhance budget transparency.  Some coun-
tries that saw substantial improvements, such as Egypt and 
Nepal, were starting from a very low base and still have 
a poor overall score.   Further, it is important not to take 
any of these improvements for granted and ensure that 
they are sustained.   
7. The average score for all 85 countries in OBI 2008 is 39, much lower than the average score for the 59 countries that were also included in OBI 2006.  This lower average score 
primarily reflects the very low scores of most of the 26 countries included in OBI 2008 that were not part of the OBI 2006.  The average OBI 2008 score for the 26 new countries 
is 21.  These countries included several of those that provide scant or no information on their budgets, such as China, Equatorial Guinea, and Saudi Arabia.
BOX 5.1 SMALLER IMPROVEMENTS ALSO 
WORTH NOTING
Some of the smaller improvements in country performance 
are also important.  For example, a number of countries, 
including Ghana and Norway, have started publishing a Citi-
zens Budget.   Other countries, such as El Salvador, Uganda, 
and Vietnam, are making more information available during 
budget execution.  Morocco and Russia are now including 
figures on past expenditures in their budget documents, 
making it easier to track trends in resource allocation and 
spending.  Finally, the governments of Ecuador and India, 
among others, have improved their budget timetables and 
are publishing more information on extra-budgetary items.
The Open Budget Survey 2008 36
Croatia
The 17-point increase in Croatia’s OBI score can be 
explained primarily by the introduction of multi-year 
estimates in budget documents, including the Executive’s 
Budget Proposal.8  Previously, the Croatian budget con-
tained information for only the current and last budget 
years.  The budget now includes data on the two years prior 
to the current year, and projections for two years ahead. 
This development is part of ongoing efforts within the 
Ministry of Finance to meet the requirements for acces-
sion to the European Union.  Between 2006 and 2008 there 
also have been some improvements in the contents of the 
Pre-Budget Statement and Year-End Reports.  Croatia also 
has started to publish a Citizens Budget.
The work of CSOs like the Institute of Public Finance (IPF), 
which conducted the research for Croatia in both 2006 
and 2008, has shaped some of the debates around budget 
transparency in the country.  IPF conducted a range of 
advocacy efforts connected with the OBI 2006, including 
producing press releases and newsletters, contributing to 
an academic journal about the findings, and maintaining 
an active presence in the media.  The Deputy Minister of 
 
Finance participated in the public presentation of the OBI 
2006 results and declared that he was eager to work to 
improve Croatia’s score.  The IPF also helped the Ministry 
improve their website and worked with legislatures at the 
national and local levels to enhance their understanding 
of the budget, producing budget and tax guides and lead-
ing training workshops.
Egypt 
In 2006 Egypt’s overall OBI score was 18, indicating that 
the government provided scant or no information on the 
budget.  In this Survey, Egypt’s overall score has improved 
to 43, showing that they now provide some, albeit incom-
plete, information on the budget.  
Egypt’s improved OBI score primarily reflects the fact 
that the Finance Ministry has, for the first time, made 
the Executive’s Budget Proposal widely available to the 
public. Egypt’s higher OBI score also ref lects a major 
2007 constitutional amendment that increases the 
time that the legislature has to consider the budget and 
enables the legislature to vote on the budget line by line.9 
Table 5.1 Significant Changes in Budget Transparency (2006-2008)
Country OBI  2006 OBI  2008 Change Comments
Egypt 18 43 +25 Publication of Executive’s Budget Proposal
Georgia 33 53 +20
Introduction of multi-year budgeting format
Publication of Citizens Budget
Elimination of extra-budgetary funds
Croatia 42 59 +17 Introduction of multi-year estimates Publication of Citizens Budget
Sri Lanka 47 64 +17 Introduction of 10-year implementation planPreparation of 3-year budget projections
Bulgaria 47 57 +10
Introduction of program budgets
Creation of National Concession Register
More documents published on Internet
Kenya 48 57 +9 Improvement in external auditIncreased citizen participation in budget process
Papua New Guinea 51 60 +9
Production and publication of Mid-Year Review
Publication of Year-End Report
More documents published on Internet
Nepal 36 43 +7 Reinstitution of Parliament after 2002 political crisis
8. As explained in greater detail in Annex A, the comprehensiveness of a country’s Executive’s Budget Proposal has substantial weight in determining its OBI score.   




Egypt’s case illustrates how a country can improve its 
OBI score simply by publishing data that it already pro-
duces but withholds from the public.  In the OBI 2006, we 
noted that Egypt produced but did not make available the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal until after it was approved 
by the legislature.  The government’s effort to make this 
document available prior to approval allows the Egyptian 
public to analyze the document while it is being discussed 
in the legislature.   
However, Egypt’s OBI 2008 score of 43 indicates significant 
room for further improvement.  The amount of informa-
tion made available to the public in the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal is not comprehensive but, rather, has some sig-
nificant gaps. In addition, the Egyptian government has 
yet to set and stick to a firm timetable for the release of the 
Executive’s Budget Proposal.   
There is also some debate over whether these transpar-
ency improvements in Egypt will be sustained.  Some 
argue that these changes are part of a sustainable process 
to increase transparency accompanying the decentraliza-
tion process led by the Ministries of Local Government, 
Planning, and Finance.  Others argue that the legislature 
still has extremely limited power relative to the executive, 
and this will constrain its ability to use its enhanced pow-
ers to effectively challenge the Executive’s Budget Proposal 
and pressure for greater information availability.   
In addition to these potential challenges to its improved 
transparency, the OBI finds that the Egyptian govern-
ment also produces but does not make widely available the 
Year-End Report and annual Audit Report.  To sustain its 
improvements, the government of Egypt should consider 
immediately making these two documents widely avail-
able to the public.  
Kenya
Several factors contributed to Kenya’s improvements in 
budget transparency, as evidenced by a nine-point increase 
on the OBI.  In 2007 the National Audit Office made sig-
nificant strides in dealing with a backlog of unaudited 
accounts and began posting Fiscal Audit Reports on its 
website.   In addition, a Parliamentary Budget Office was 
established in 2007 to help legislators with budget research 
and improve their capacity to engage in the budget pro-
cess, and public expenditure tracking surveys have been 
undertaken to inform budget implementation and execu-
tion.  Finally, the government has rolled out an Integrated 
Financial Management Information System (an IT sys-
tem that supports budget formulation and execution) 
and launched a program-based performance budgeting 
initiative, which will facilitate resource tracking and 
monitoring.  
Kenya also has increased opportunities for civil society 
participation in the budget process.  For the 2007-08 bud-
get, the government began asking members of the public 
to contribute proposals and views by sending emails to the 
Ministry for Finance during the drafting phase.  Sector 
Working Groups that bring together various members 
of the public to discuss government policies have offered 
additional avenues for participation in the budget pro-
cess.  Some of the above reforms were implemented by 
the government with the support of international donor 
agencies; others were spearheaded by civil society orga-
nizations, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs and 
the Kenya Budget Engagement Forum, in collaboration 
with Parliament.
Nepal 
The seven-point improvement in Nepal’s OBI score is 
largely due to dramatic political shifts in the country that 
have occurred in recent years.  In 2006 a people’s move-
ment was established to overthrow the autocratic King 
Gyanendra.  The movement comprised an alliance of seven 
political parties, as well as a range of CSOs.  Among other 
things, the movement succeeded in restoring the Nepalese 
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Parliament, which had been dissolved in 2002.  (The disso-
lution of the legislature was the major factor contributing 
to Nepal’s lower score of 36 on the OBI 2006.)  
The case of Nepal shows how political change spurred by 
popular movements can enhance transparency and bring 
about institutional changes that strengthen accountability 
and governance.  At the same time, Nepal’s score in 2008—
43 out of a possible 100—indicates significant room for 
further improving budget transparency in the country.   
It is an open question whether Nepal’s government and 
legislature will sustain or further improve its transpar-
ency performance.  Much depends on the drafting of the 
new Constitution, which will be done by a constitutional 
assembly over the next two years.  The OBI researchers 
anticipate that the new Constitution will address public 
access to information, including budget information, and 
the role of the legislature in the budget process.  The coun-
try’s political situation is also somewhat fragile, which may 
stall or even undermine further improvements.
Sri Lanka
The impressive increase in Sri Lanka’s OBI score (17 points) 
reflects a substantive increase in the amount of budget 
information available to the public, following a change of 
government in 2006.   The new government published and 
widely disseminated a 10-year implementation plan map-
ping Sri Lanka’s longer-term development goals.  Further, 
publicly available budget execution reports (called “Fiscal 
Position Reports”) have begun to contain much more 
detailed information, including information on unfore-
seen and contingency spending.
Civil society organizations contributed to some of these 
improvements by actively demanding information from 
government on the national budget.  For example, CSOs 
filed seven petitions challenging the 2007 Budget.  In par-
ticular, they were concerned with the fact that the Treasury 
was given full discretion to transfer funds designated for 
“development activities” to meet expenditure under other 
programs.  The Supreme Court ruled that such powers 
denied the right of the public to scrutinize and evaluate 
the use of public funds.  Parliamentary committees have 
also been active in demanding that the budget process be 
more transparent and accountable.
Table 5.2 Availability of Key Budget Documents




Strategies for improving civil 
society access to information
The examples above show that improvements in budget 
transparency are possible across a range of contexts.  A 
comparison between the results of the Open Budget Survey 
2008 and those of 2006 shows that the vast majority of 
countries, especially low-scoring countries, can make 
meaningful improvements in budget transparency imme-
diately and cost-effectively.  This section provides practical 
suggestions for achieving this.    
Publish whatever information you produce
Survey researchers found that a significant number of 
governments (51 of the 85 surveyed) produce at least one 
budget document, and often several, for their donors or 
internal purposes that they do not release to the public. 
(See Table 5.2.)  Thus many countries could quickly and 
cost-effectively boost budget transparency by publishing 
information that they already produce.
Afghanistan provides an illustrative example.  It scores 
only 8 out of 100 on the OBI 2008.   However, Afghanistan 
already produces a Pre-Budget Statement, an Executive’s 
Budget Proposal, and an Audit Report.  Were the Afghan 
government to release all three of these documents to the 
public, its OBI score would increase significantly, reflect-
ing expanded opportunities for public engagement in 
Afghanistan’s budget process.  
Sudan is another extreme case.  Sudan scores 0 on the 
OBI 2008 because it does not release any of the key bud-
get documents to the public.  However, Sudan actually 
does produce seven of the eight key budget documents 
covered in the Survey, although the quality and compre-
hensiveness of these documents may vary. Still, making 
these publicly available would boost Sudan’s transparency 
considerably.  
The fact that so much information is produced but not 
made publicly available suggests that many governments 
are not transparent by choice, rather than because they do 
not have sufficient capacity to produce and disseminate 
greater budget information to the public.   It also suggests 
that donors could play a more active role in encouraging 
greater transparency in recipient countries.  
Publish on the Internet
Even when a document is “publicly available,” it may not 
be accessible to all members of the public.   That is, it may 
only be available on request, or one may have to pay a fee to 
obtain a copy.  Posting budget documents on the Internet 
could help address this problem by providing simultaneous 
access to multiple users at low cost.  Table 5.3 shows that 68 
of the 85 countries surveyed post the Enacted Budget on 
the Internet, but fewer post the other documents.
Produce a Citizens Budget 
In many developing countries a very limited portion of 
the population has access to computers and the Internet. 
Low incomes and literacy levels further limit the ability of 
many to access information provided online.  A Citizens 
Budget can help bridge this gap.  This is especially true if it 
is disseminated in languages and by means that are acces-
sible to the majority of the population, including news-
paper inserts or radio presentations in local languages. 
Citizens Budgets may be complemented by other popular 
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means of presenting budget information, such as using 
illustrations and drama to share the key messages of the 
budget and to encourage public involvement in the bud-
get process.  Popular dissemination need not be restricted 
to the Executive’s Budget Proposal or Enacted Budget.  A 
government might use these same methods to disseminate 
information produced in other stages of the budget pro-
cess, particularly in the execution and audit stages.  
It is thus encouraging that a small but growing number of 
countries surveyed (17 out of 85) produce Citizens Budgets. 
These include high-income countries like Norway and New 
Zealand, as well as low- and middle-income countries like 
Ghana, India, and El Salvador.
Approve Freedom of 
Information legislation  
Growing global support for improving public service 
delivery is spurring interest in ensuring that the public 
has access to highly detailed budget information, espe-
cially on social programs.  This might include information 
on how much money is spent on particular schools and 
health clinics, for instance.  Such highly detailed informa-
tion is generally not included in a country’s budget docu-
ments, but civil society needs access to this more detailed 
budget information to be effective advocates.  Freedom 
of Information laws offer a promising and systemic legal 
avenue to bridge this gap.  
The majority of the countries surveyed (55 out of 85) have 
codified the right to access budget information.  However, 
having a law on the books does not guarantee it will be 
upheld in practice.   Table 5.4 shows that in only 13 of the 
55 countries that have Freedom of Information laws is it 
generally possible in practice to get the information.  For 
the remaining 42 countries, the right to information exists, 
but the law does not work effectively.
Table 5.4  Right to Access Government Information, Including Budget Information
Yes, the right has been codified 
into law, and citizens are 
generally able in practice 
to obtain government 
information, including budget 
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The Open Budget Survey 2008 paints a disappointing pic-
ture of the state of budget transparency around the world. 
In the vast majority of countries surveyed, the public does 
not have access to the comprehensive, timely, and useful 
information needed to participate meaningfully in the 
budget process and hold government to account for the 
management of public resources.  
However, the Survey also offers grounds for hope.  A num-
ber of countries in the Survey have started to improve 
their budget transparency performance over the past two 
years.  There are good performers within each region, level 
of income, level of aid or natural resource dependency. 
The Survey also finds that many more governments could 
quickly improve budget transparency at low cost.   
Given the central role of transparency in oversight and 
accountability, IBP calls on individuals, civil society orga-
nizations, governments, legislatures, SAIs, and donors in 
all countries to take action to raise the profile of the prob-
lems identified through the Survey and demand urgent 
improvements in public access to budget information.  
To achieve immediate improvements in budget transpar-
ency, IBP urges: 
Governments »  to make publicly available the key budget 
documents and other related budget information that 
they produce but do not release to the public.  As a 
first step, governments should immediately make this 
information available on the Internet, which facilitates 
wider availability of the information and reduces dis-
cretionary access.   
Donors »  to encourage aid-recipient governments to make 
publicly available information they produce for their 
donors or internal purposes.
Civil society »  to publicize and demand explanations for 
instances in which governments do not make publicly 
available the key budget documents and other related 
budget information that they produce for their donors 
or internal purposes.
Beyond these immediate steps, there are many other poli-
cies and actions that can be undertaken in the near term 
that will help to strengthen and define the public’s demand 
for information and participation and build the capacity 
of oversight institutions.  To these ends, the IBP recom-
mends the following actions. 
Governments
Disseminate budget information in forms and through  »
methods and media that are understandable and 
useful to the wider population.  This should include 
disseminating information through radio or other 
broadcast media, and in languages spoken by the major-
ity of the population.
Institutionalize mechanisms for public involvement  »
in the budget process, including public hearings during 
formulation and discussion of the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal, and at regular intervals throughout the budget 
cycle.  This will provide the public with opportunities to 
use expanded access to budget information to influence 
policy decisions and hold government to account.  
Expand opportunities for media coverage of the bud- »
get process, for example, by opening budget hearings 
to journalists or broadcasting these hearings on radio, 
television, and the Internet.  
Support relevant reforms to improve the independence  »
and capacity of the legislature and supreme audit 
institution to play their formal oversight role.  Reforms 
should address the political and financial independence 
of these institutions, as well as their analytical capacity, 
access to the executive, and other legal powers required 
to fulfill their mandate. 
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Build effective public finance information systems  » that 
enhance the quality and timeliness of available budget 
information, for example, through the use of clear, 
standardized classification systems and appropriate 
Information Technology (IT).
International financial institutions 
and donors
Increase the transparency of aid flows and avoid  »
off-budget funding.  Wherever possible, channel aid 
flows through local budget systems.  Where this is not 
possible, provide information on aid flows in formats 
that are compatible with local budget systems, using 
government classification systems and respecting budget 
calendars.  This will allow for more comprehensive cov-
erage of aid flows in budget documents and, therefore, 
increase overall budget transparency.  It also will reduce 
the strain on domestic budget management caused by 
multiple and fragmented donor interventions.
Support reforms for building effective public finance  »
information systems that can enhance the capacity of 
the government to produce accurate and timely budget 
information.  
Increase technical assistance and funding to civil soci- »
ety, legislatures, and supreme audit institutions as part 
of a comprehensive package of efforts to improve budget 
accountability and oversight.  This support should seek 
to improve the capacity of these institutions to analyze 
budget information and hold government to account.
Conduct additional research  » on whether donor inter-
ventions and ongoing budget reforms are improving bud-
get transparency in practice, given the noted tendency of 
aid-dependent countries to be less transparent.
Civil society organizations
Use the Open Budget Survey 2008 findings to develop  »
advocacy strategies and to issue specific, construc-
tive suggestions for governments to improve budget 
transparency and public participation in the budget 
process.
Work to enforce existing Freedom of Information  »
laws by using these laws to access budget information 
for analysis and advocacy purposes.  
Produce and disseminate simplified popular versions  »
of key budget documents in languages spoken by the 
majority of the population and assist with dissemination 
of budget materials through different media, either in 
collaboration with or independent of government.  
Support the work of the legislature and SAI » .  This may 
include providing training and information, acting as 
whistle-blowers, and conducting joint and parallel 
audits.
Advocate for stronger institutional arrangements gov- »
erning the role of legislatures and SAIs in the budget 
process, focusing on strengthening their relations and 
engagement with the public and civil society. 
Work with the media to enhance the quality of cover- »
age of budget issues by providing targeted training 
and timely information.  This can enhance public 
understanding of the budget process and improve the 
quality and impact of public participation.
Follow up on the Open Budget Survey 2008  » with 
research that examines the findings in greater detail 






Putting the above recommendations into practice will 
significantly improve budget transparency and public 
engagement with budget processes.  Ultimately, however, 
a more systemic solution is often needed, especially to 
access detailed programmatic information.  In some coun-
tries, ensuring timely and low-cost access to information 
for all will require codifying the public’s right to budget 
information through such mechanisms as Freedom of 
Information laws or constitutional amendments.  In 
countries where such laws exist, the challenge often is 
ensuring that they are enforced.   
Finally, while the above recommendations are valid across 
all countries, many more specific actions can and should 
be identified and pursued at the country level.  For this 
purpose, the completed Open Budget Questionnaire for 
each country, together with detailed peer review com-
ments, is available at www.openbudgetindex.org.  The IBP 
hopes that this will serve as a useful resource to identify-
ing potential further steps and local solutions to improve 






The Open Budget Survey is based on a detailed question-
naire that is intended to collect a comparative dataset on 
the public availability of budget information and other 
accountable budgeting practices in 85 countries. (The full 
questionnaire is available at www.openbudgetindex.org.) 
It guides civil society researchers from each country 
through each of the four stages of the budget process, 
assisting them in evaluating the information that should 
be made available to the public at each stage.  It also identi-
fies and evaluates accountable budgeting practices during 
each stage of the budget year.
The questionnaire contains a total of 123 questions.  The 
responses to 91 of the questions that evaluate public access 
to budget information were averaged to form the Open 
Budget Index.  The remaining 32 questions cover topics 
related to opportunities for public participation in the bud-
get process and the ability of key oversight institutions of 
government to hold the executive accountable.  
The questionnaire consists of multiple-choice and open-
ended questions on how budget documents are dissemi-
nated.  It groups questions into three sections: 1) the 
dissemination of budget information,  2) the executive’s 
annual budget proposal to the legislature (Questions 
1-55) and the availability of other information that would 
contribute to analysis of budget policies and practices 
(Questions 56-65), and 3) the four phases of the budget 
process (Questions 66-123).
The questions evaluate publicly available information 
issued by the central government but do not address the 
availability of information at the subnational level.  The 
majority of the questions ask about what occurs in prac-
tice, rather than about the requirements that may exist in 
law.  All of the questions were constructed so as to capture 
easily observable phenomena.  Researchers completing the 
questionnaires and peer reviewers commenting on them 
were asked to provide evidence for their responses.  The 
evidence took the form of a reference to a budget docu-
ment, a law, or other public document; a public statement 
by a government official; or a face-to-face interview with a 
government official or other knowledgeable party.
The questions were not intended to evaluate the quality or 
credibility of information that a government might pro-
vide.  For example, the questions do not evaluate whether 
information on government expenditures, revenues, or 
debt may have been illicitly omitted or withheld.  The ques-
tions also do not evaluate the credibility of macroeconomic 
forecasting or economic assumptions used in a country’s 
budget estimates.  
Many of the questions focus on the contents and time-
liness of eight key budget documents that all countries 
should issue, according to generally accepted good prac-
tice criteria for public sector financial management. 
The Open Budget Questionnaire
SECTION ONE:  
THE AVAILABILITY OF BUDGET DOCUMENTS
Table 1.  Budget Year of Documents Used  •	
in Completing the Questionnaire
Table 2.  Key Budget Documents Used: Full Titles  •	
and Internet Links
Table 3.  Distribution of Documents Related  •	
to the Executive’s Budget Proposal
Table 4.  Distribution of Enacted Budget  •	
and Other Reports
SECTION TWO: 
THE EXECUTIVE’S BUDGET PROPOSAL
Estimates for the Budget Year and Beyond•	
Estimates for Years Prior to the Budget Year•	
Comprehensiveness•	
The Budget Narrative and Performance Monitoring•	
Additional Key Information for Budget Analysis  •	
and Monitoring
SECTION THREE:  
THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Executive’s Formulation of the Budget•	
Legislative Approval of the Budget•	
Executive’s Implementation of the Budget•	
Year-end Report and the Supreme Audit Institution•	
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Many of these criteria are similar to those developed 
by multilateral organizations, such as the IMF’s Code 
of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, the OECD’s 
Best Practices for Budget Transparency, and the United 
Nations International Organization of Supreme Auditing 
Institutions’ (INTOSAI) Lima Declaration of Guidelines 
on Auditing Precepts.  INTOSAI is a professional organi-
zation of national supreme audit institutions established 
by the UN to share information and experiences related 
to public sector auditing.  
The strength of such guidelines as the IMF Fiscal 
Transparency Code and the Lima Declaration lies in their 
universal applicability to differing budget systems around 
the world and to countries with differing income levels. 
However, IBP believes that they do not go far enough to 
ensure that budgeting is responsive and accountable to 
the public.  For this reason the IBP includes an eighth key 
budget document that should be released by governments: 
a Citizens Budget—a non-technical, accessible version of 
the budget aimed at increasing public understanding of the 
government’s plans for taxing and spending.
The Open Budget Questionnaire also covers additional 
topics of importance to civil society, including factors 
related to legislative oversight, such as whether or not the 
legislature holds public hearings on the budget, and on the 
role of the country’s independent national audit office, also 
known as the supreme audit institution.
The Open Budget Index 
The Open Budget Index assigns each country a score based 
on the average of the responses to 91 questions related to 
public availability of information on the Open Budget 
Questionnaire.  This score reflects the quantity of pub-
licly available budget information in the eight key bud-
get documents.  In particular, the public availability and 
comprehensiveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal is a 
key determinant of a country’s OBI score, as evidenced by 
the fact that 58 out of the 91 questions used to determine 
a country’s OBI score concern the Executive’s Budget 
Proposal.
Most of the questions in the Open Budget Questionnaire 
require the researcher to choose among five responses. 
Responses “a” or “b” describe a situation or condition that 
represents good practice regarding the subject matter of the 
question.  The responses “c” or “d” correspond to practices 
that are considered poor.  An “a” response indicates that 
a standard is fully met, while a “d” response indicates a 
standard is not met at all.  The fifth response is “e,” or not 
applicable.  Researchers were asked to provide evidence 
for their responses and to enrich their questionnaires with 
comments, as appropriate.  
For the purposes of aggregating the responses, the numeric 
score of 100 percent was awarded for an “a” response, 67 
percent for a “b,” 33 percent for a “c,” and zero for a “d.” 
The response of “e” caused the question not to be counted 
as part of the aggregated category.  
Some questions have three possible responses: “a,” “b,” or 
“c” (not applicable).  For these questions, a score of 100 
percent was awarded for the “a” response, and zero for the 
“b” response.  The “c” response caused the question not to 
be included in the aggregated category.
Assessing legislatures and 
supreme audit institutions
In order to assess how the legislature and the SAI can 
contribute to budget transparency and accountability in 
Questions Included in the 
Open Budget Index
Executive’s Budget Proposal  Questions 1-55, 66-68 
Citizens Budget  Question 61 
Pre-Budget Statement  Questions 71, 72, 73 
In-Year Reports  Questions 82, 83, 85-90
Mid-Year Review  Questions 92-95 
Year-End Report  Questions 101-110 




a country, we focused on 22 questions that reflect the abil-
ity of these institutions to provide effective oversight.  To 
gain an overall sense of the strength of these institutions, 
we averaged the responses to the relevant questions to cal-
culate a “strength” score for each institution.  These mea-
sures of institutional strength should be used as indicative 
data only, as the dataset of questions on the legislature and 
the SAI is not as comprehensive as is the data on issues of 
public access to information.
The research process
IBP worked with civil society partners in 85 countries over 
the past two years to use the Open Budget Questionnaire 
to collect the data for the Survey 2008.  The 85 countries 
in the study were chosen with the intention of building a 
sample that is balanced across global geographic regions 
and across country income levels.  
The survey instrument has now been implemented in two 
separate rounds of research, each of two years duration. 
The 2008 round of research was preceded by a previous 
round in 2006 with partners in 59 countries.  IBP and its 
partner organizations gathered, compiled, and analyzed 
data in 2005 and 2006 to produce the first published version 
of the Open Budget Survey in October 2006.  IBP intends 
to undertake at least two further rounds of research, with 
published results expected in 2010 and 2012, to allow for 
comparisons of performance over time.
All of the researchers who have been responsible for 
completing the Open Budget Questionnaire during the 
2006 and 2008 rounds of research are employed by either 
academic institutions or civil society organizations.  The 
mandates and areas of interest of the research groups vary 
widely, but all have a common interest in promoting access 
to information during each of the four phases of the bud-
get process, in strengthening the role and powers of the 
legislature, and in the performance of the supreme audit 
institution.  Most are groups with a significant focus on 
budget issues; many employ researchers who are experts 
involved in budget matters on a daily basis.
One researcher or group of researchers within an orga-
nization from each of the countries was responsible for 
submitting one completed questionnaire for that country. 
Thus the results presented for each country are based on a 
single completed questionnaire.  
For the 2008 round of research, the researchers began 
collecting data in June 2007 and completed the question-
naire by September 2007.  No events or developments that 
occurred after September 28, 2007, are taken into account 
in completing the questionnaires.  Researchers were asked 
to provide evidence for their responses, such as citations 
from budget documents; the country’s laws; or interviews 
with government officials, legislators, or others expert on 
the budget process.  
Once the questionnaires were completed, IBP staff under-
took an analysis of each questionnaire and in most cases 
spent three to six months in discussions with researchers 
to review the questionnaires.  The IBP analysis focused 
on ensuring that the questions were answered in a man-
ner that was internally consistent, as well as consistent 
across countries.  The answers were also cross-checked 
against publicly available information.  This included 
those budget documents that countries made available 
on the Internet, data collected by the Bank Information 
Center (a Washington, DC-based nonprofit that moni-
tors the activities of international financial institutions); 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), cover-
ing fiscal transparency; IMF Article IV reports; World 
Bank documents and publications, including Public 
Questions Used to 
Evaluate Legislatures & SAIs
Legislatures  Questions 69, 74-81, 96, 98, 100
SAIs   Questions 111, 114, 116-123
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Expenditure Reviews; and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development-World Bank budgeting 
practices database.
The IBP provided researchers with a Guide to the Open 
Budget Questionnaire, available at www.openbudgetindex.
org.  The guide outlined the research method to be used in 
completing the questionnaire and introduced researchers 
to internationally recognized good practices and concepts 
related to budget transparency and public expenditure 
management.  The guide also provided detailed explana-
tions on how to choose between possible responses and the 
assumptions to use in answering each question.
Once IBP staff reviewed the draft questionnaires, they 
were submitted to two peer reviewers, whose identities 
were not revealed to the researchers.  The peer reviewers 
were required to be independent of both the government 
and the research organization of the researcher.  The peer 
reviewers were all individuals with substantial working 
knowledge of the country being reviewed and its budget 
system.  They were identified by searching bibliographies, 
professional contacts, the Internet, and past IBP confer-
ence records.  Peer reviewer comments can be seen in their 
entirety in the published version of the questionnaires, 
available at www.openbudgetindex.org.
An important modification to the research process was 
introduced in 2008.  Governments of the countries sur-
veyed were invited to provide their comments in the pub-
lished version of the questionnaire.  The decision to invite 
a government to participate was made at the request of 
the research organization responsible for completing the 
questionnaire. 
IBP contacted and invited government officials in 61 coun-
tries to provide comments on the draft questionnaires. 
IBP staff contacted each government with repeated writ-
ten invitations, in most cases on five or six occasions, to 
ensure that each government was aware of the opportunity 
to comment.  Of those 61 governments invited, just five 
provided comments in the questionnaires.  These com-
ments can be seen in their entirety in the questionnaires 
for El Salvador, Guatemala, Norway, South Africa, and 
Sweden at www.openbudgetindex.org.
IBP staff reviewed peer reviewer comments to ensure that 
the comments were consistent with the study’s meth-
odology as outlined in the Guide to the Open Budget 
Questionnaire.  Any peer reviewer comments that were 
inconsistent with the guide were removed, and the 
remaining comments were then shared with researchers. 
Researchers responded to comments from peer reviewers 
and the government, if applicable, and IBP editors refer-
eed any conflicting answers to ensure the consistency of 
assumptions across countries in selecting answers.
Definitions of 
“publicly available” information
The Open Budget Index assesses the scope and compre-
hensiveness of budget information made available to the 
public.  We defined “publicly available” information as that 
which any and all members of the public might be able to 
obtain through a request to the public authority issuing 
the document.  This definition, therefore, includes infor-
mation that is available through well-defined procedures 
that ensure simultaneous release of public documents to 
all interested parties, as well as information or documents 
that are available only on request.
Some countries in the study had clearly defined proce-
dures for ensuring the simultaneous release of public 
documents to all interested parties.  The adoption of clear 
procedures in law for disseminating budget documents, 
along with respect for those procedures in practice, are 
viewed by some countries as important to maintaining an 
international reputation for sound financial management. 




to or maintaining favorable treatment in international 
capital markets adopt such procedures on their own, or as 
participants in such initiatives as the IMF’s General Data 
Dissemination System initiative.  
Many of the countries in the study, however, did not have 
legal provisions in place for the release of budget informa-
tion or, if they had them, did not abide by them in prac-
tice.  In these countries, information was available only 
on request.  The researchers in these countries answered 
questions based only on publicly available information. 
In some cases, groups conducted unannounced site visits 
themselves or asked members of other civil society groups, 
journalists, or others to request budget documents to test 
their availability to the general public.  In other cases, 
researchers conducted surveys of civil society and other 
users of budget information to determine the availability 
of a document.  
This was necessary because in some countries substantial 
budget information is produced but is not shared with the 
public at all, or government officials make arbitrary deci-
sions regarding which individuals they are willing to share 
information with.  In those cases in which information was 
available only on request, if there were instances in which 
an individual requested the document but it was denied to 
him or her, the document was considered as not available 
to the public for the purposes of the study.  
The definition of “publicly available” information used in 
the study implies that the method a government chooses to 
disseminate documents does not affect its performance on 
the Open Budget Index.  Specifically, whether or not a gov-
ernment chooses to use the Internet to disseminate docu-
ments does not affect its score on the Open Budget Index, 
nor are countries that disseminate documents exclusively 
by making printed copies available penalized.  However, 
the questionnaire does collect data in the tables that appear 
in Section One of the study (which are not used to calculate 
the Open Budget Index) to explore the growing trend of 
Internet availability.  
Further tests of strength of data
In addition to the thorough review process, IBP also con-
ducted two further tests to check the reliability and robust-
ness of the data.  First, the Survey results were compared 
with the results of other indices of governance and trans-
parency to see how the Survey fares as an overall indicator 
of the governance situation in a country.  
The Survey results showed a strong, positive correlation 
with the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator on 
Voice & Accountability (0.737), the Global Integrity Index 
produced by Global Integrity (0.681), and the Democracy 
Index produced by Freedom House (0.691).  These posi-
tive results suggest that OBI is a relatively good proxy for 
broader measures of governance and the quality of insti-
tutions in the countries covered.  
IBP also constructed a “unanimity score,” a measure to 
capture the degree of debate between the researcher and 
the two peer reviewers responsible for completing the ques-
tionnaire in each country.   The scores for this Measure of 
Unanimity are shown in the table below.
The Open Budget Survey is intended to provoke public 
debate about budget transparency, public participation in 
budget debates, and accountability of budget institutions. 
As such, the research process frequently results in debate 
among the experts in the country responsible for complet-
ing and reviewing the questionnaires about important 
public financial management topics.  IBP attempts to cap-
ture this debate through the “unanimity score” and by pub-
lishing within each questionnaire the exchanges between 
researchers and reviewers that led to the selection of 
a final answer to each Survey question (available at www.
openbudgetindex.org).   
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Countries that received high “unanimity scores” demon-
strate a high degree of agreement between the researchers 
and peer reviewers on the answer selections, while coun-
tries that receive low scores had a lower degree of agreement 
between the research and peer reviewers.  As can be see 
from the table, there was a very high degree of agreement 
between the researchers and the peer reviewers in the vast 
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